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They'd Rather Have Atomic Arms Than Save Berlin

To understand the Kennedy-Adenauer talks, it is useful to go back and reread a passage in a book review the President wrote during the campaign last year.* In it he said that the instabilities which would result from a spread of nuclear weapons were "equally dangerous to Russian and American interests" and added that it was the "duty of American statesmen" to "exploit" this "overlapping interest." In his address to the United Nations on Sept. 25 Mr. Kennedy indicated that in the Berlin negotiations he hoped to exploit this by offering to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons "to nations that do not now own them." Mr. Kennedy has seen more in such an offer than a useful bargaining position. Since taking office he has been disturbed to find how diffuse the President's supposed power to control the use of nuclear weapons has become as these have spread out in so many different forms to so many foreign bases. But this is the sharpest point of difference between Washington and Bonn. The main purpose of the Adenauer trip is to block any agreement which would deny nuclear arms to Germany.

A New Stab-in-the-Back Legend

To the Germans it has been patiently explained that Mr. Kennedy is not proposing an atom free zone, nor suggesting that atomic missiles be withdrawn from the German forces but merely, as part of a Berlin settlement, to freeze the present situation, under which atomic warheads remain under our control. These explanations have been to no avail. Indeed for weeks German correspondents here had great difficulty in getting their papers to print explanations of American policy. The German government, instead of trying to awaken its public to political realities, has been encouraging a wave of self-pity, a new variant of the stab-in-the-back legend—"America has let Germany down." The Kennedy Administration has been particularly disturbed because Bonn made no effort to let German public opinion know the truth about the business of the East Berlin wall. Contingency planning in which the Germans participated did not call for action in the event that East Berlin were cut off. It was access to West Berlin, not East Berlin, which was to be defended by force.

More Difficult Than The Russians

The truth is that there is now greater difficulty in getting down to negotiations over Berlin with Bonn than with Moscow. The Russians have lifted the deadline, and they have offered to make a new four power agreement on West Berlin and then embody it in a separate agreement of their own with East Germany. It is the West Germans who are obdurate and would leave no room at all for bargaining or maneuver. Some of their spokesmen would be ludicrous if the situation were not so dangerous. On the one hand they complain that they do not think the American public is really prepared to plunge into nuclear war over Berlin; on the other hand, they are unwilling to make the slightest concession to settle the issue peacefully. The Germans have been told that reunification can only be brought about by peaceful means. The White House has suggested increased contacts with East Germany, arguing that it is folly for a powerful state like West Germany to fear contacts with a weak one like East Germany ruled by a hated minority, and that the West Germans can gain much from peaceful penetration but Bonn stands on its sterile insistence that it will accord no recognition of any kind to East Germany. This hardly leaves room for negotiation, and without it West Berlin is apt to wither on the vine in an atmosphere of renewed threat and tension. But there are Germans who are more interested in maintaining tension than in maintaining West Berlin, for heightened tension increases their chances for nuclear weapons, and that is the No. 1 goal.

We've Become the Suppliant

The President might try getting tough with the Germans. Unfortunately a shift in the power balance has taken place. The U.S. is asking Bonn for help in meeting our unfavorable balance of payments and in sharing the burden of aid to the underdeveloped countries. Our business men are worried about access to the huge Common Market in which West Germany plays a dominant role. West German representatives here have said bluntly that we'll get no help if we do not "stand firm" on Berlin, and for them this translates back into the question of nuclear arms.

In the meantime an old game is being resumed. It had been agreed that further explorations in Moscow would be left to our Ambassador. The German Ambassador violated this agreement by his own meeting with Khrushchev, a meeting about which he did not inform his Western colleagues. Naturally this was disavowed by Bonn, but it served the dual purpose of sounding out Moscow on the eve of the Washington talks and of raising the spectre of an agreement with the East if the Germans cannot get what they want in the West. The most important "overlapping interest" now between Washington and Moscow is settling the Berlin question and bringing the Germans under control *before* they get nuclear weapons. Afterwards it will be too late.

*** Of B. H. Liddell Hart's "Deterrent or Defense" in the Saturday Review of Literature, Sept. 30, 1960.**

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Publisher of Scientific American Calls Civil Defense A Dangerous Illusion...

We present here an abridged version of a speech made at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco Nov. 10 by Gerard Piel, publisher of the Scientific American, and the author of the recently published, "Science in The Cause of Man," a collection of brilliant essays on a series of urgent problems—from disarmament to governmental secrecy—as seen by an unusually perceptive mind, cultivated in both science and the humanities.

"No one in this audience, I suppose, will question my declaration that the Soviet Union, by resuming the testing of nuclear weapons, has increased the danger of war. I suspect, however, that I must document my charge that shelter-building in the U.S. also brings the Third World War closer. When you have apprehended the nature of the war I believe you will join me in the conclusion that civil defense is an illusion—an illusion that places our institutions and our lives in jeopardy.

The citizen who sets out to study thermonuclear war will find himself richly supplied with literature by his government. I have reviewed this material, and I must tell you that I find it to be incomplete and uneven in quality and reliability. This literature is threaded with two major strands of bias. One strong bias originates from the desire to envision and secure a significant civil defense. This human tendency is entirely understandable in relation to the grave concerns of civil defense. Equally understandable is the pressure of bias that flows from the military contribution to the literature. One would expect military people to argue the validity of military solutions to political problems. It is perhaps less understandable—and surely less creditable—that their quasi-independent consultants should tell them what they want to hear. But you should not be surprised to learn the conclusion to which pressure from this quarter leads. That is that thermonuclear war is not only possible and probable but also feasible.

A Delicate Paradox

The objective of civil defense poses a delicate paradox. In all humanity, we must encourage measures that can save the lives of individuals. In the national interest, one must seek to minimize the number of casualties. But if such measures enhance the feasibility of thermonuclear war, they may also raise the probability of war. At best, they increase the likelihood of unprecedented catastrophe. At worst, if the assumptions on which the civil defense measures are predicated prove to be wrong, they expose the nation and its people to unlimited catastrophe.

In the present atmosphere, it is difficult to recall that 16 years ago the atomic scientists had proved war is obsolete. To recapture the mood of the nuclear physicists we must take a still closer look at what happens in a nuclear explosion. The escalation from kilotons to megatons requires reconsideration of civil defense.

The destructive capacity of still larger weapons is expressed on the same scale of TNT-equivalent explosive power. But this scale has decreasing relevance to the true nature of these weapons as they grow larger. The ranges of the three prompt effects—initial radiation, heat and blast—increase at different rates with increase in size. This is to say that the three concentric circles of destruction and lethality that were co-terminous at Hiroshima increase at significantly different rates as technology packs more violence into the nuclear warhead. The initial-radiation circle increases most slowly because this radiation is absorbed and scattered, and it falls so far within the other two that it may be ignored. The circle of total destruction by blast grows faster; its radius increases as the cube root of the increase in TNT-equivalent tonnage. But the circular area showered with thermal radiation grows the fastest of all; its radius increases as the square root of the increase in power. Thus, the area engulfed in the incendiary effects of the bigger weapons reaches outward far beyond the perimeter of the blast circle.

The tables show that the 20 megaton bomb, which is 1,000 times bigger than the 20 kiloton bomb, has a blast radius of between 5 to 6 miles and an incendiary radius of 30 miles. By the same token, the 50 megaton bomb tested in the Soviet Union must have a blast radius of 7 miles, but an incendiary radius of 50; a 100-megaton bomb would have a blast radius of 8 miles and an incendiary radius of 70. If 100, why not 1,000 megatons? Such a weapon would have an incendiary radius of 200 miles.

The conclusion to be comprehended here is that the bigger the weapon the more preponderantly it becomes an incendiary weapon. Not much is said about firestorms in the literature of thermonuclear war. There was some experience with small firestorms ignited by ordinary bombs in World War II; the firestorm at Dresden is estimated to have killed 300,000 people in a single night; at Hamburg, some 70,000; at Tokyo, some 200,000. Blast-proof bomb shelters afforded no protection in these storms; their occupants were found suffocated and cremated when the shelters were opened.

The incendiary effect can be magnified still further by bursting the bigger weapons at very high altitude. Since most of the atmosphere lies closer to the ground, there is little loss of energy, and the cone of effective thermal radiation gains a still wider radius at its base. According to one set of calculations a 1,000 megaton bomb detonated at satellite altitude could set six Western—Western, not Middle Western—states afire.

It is evident from the literature that no adequate consideration has been given to the incendiary aspect of thermonuclear war. The effort to establish fallout shelters in the central cities will provide such protection if fallout is the hazard to which the population is exposed. If not, these shelters will trap the urban populations in blast and fire. The individual citizen is urged to provide for himself the fallout "protection best suited to his needs." That 60 per-cent of the population that has basements readily accessible to it is advised to install a "basement shelter that can be built with solid concrete blocks as a do-it-yourself project" for $150 to $200. Again, such a shelter will provide protection if fallout is the only hazard to which its occupants are exposed. Within the incendiary radius of a big bomb, however, the basement shelter becomes a fire trap.

The idea that fallout constitutes the principal hazard to the civilian population is a derivation from military theory. Remembering Pearl Harbor, our military thinkers are convinced that the enemy will lay the primary weight of his attack upon our military installation. We have the word from Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who commanded the 20th Air Force in our strike against Hiroshima and Nagasaki: "There is no point in going after the civilian population as such." The first attack

Nuclear War Might Even Lower Taxes

"As reorganization swings into recuperation, property rights will have to be untangled and the costs of the war distributed equitably. Many survivors would have lost everything, while others might find themselves richer by the untimely deaths of families or relatives. In the event of huge casualties, a lot of property would revert to the state by escheat. This would ultimately be sold, and the proceeds distributed in the form of tax reduction. . . ."

—"The Economy Can Survive Nuclear Attack" in the Nov. 1961 issue of Fortune Magazine.

Veteran Naval Radiologist Prefers Wiser International Relations to Shelters

"A grand old man of radiological science set an Assembly subcommittee to sputtering yesterday when he said 'international relations' is the best defense against nuclear attack—not fallout shelters.

"The opinion was expressed bluntly by Dr. Robert R. Newell at a session here of the interim subcommittee on air pollution and radiation. . . . [He said] 'I don't think shelters are the place where we should focus our attention. I think we should explore other routes with a lower probability of death. . . .'

"Dr. Newell is professor emeritus of radiology at Stanford, a member of Governor Edmund G. Brown's radiological defense advisory committee and a staff member of the Navy's Radiological Defense Laboratory at Hunters Point.

"The octogenarian said crisply that in case of a nuclear attack there is a '50 percent chance of survival, give or take 40 percent.' Shelters for all or shelters for none was his motto, on the theory that a short supply would bring nothing but mass death by starvation or suffocation.

"Assemblyman Byron Rumford of Berkeley asked for his alternative. 'International relations,' answered the scientist. 'I don't think we've explored other ways of getting along than military strength.'"

—San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 8.

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. . . Says Danger of Firestorms Greater Than Fallout As Bombs Grow Bigger

by the enemy would therefore be what is called a "counterforce" attack, directed at the destruction of our capacity to retaliate.

To be effective the weight of this attack would have to be considerable. An independent study by a meteorologist at the University of Arizona shows that 300 megatons would have to be laid in a few minutes upon the 18 hardened Titan bases that ring the city of Tucson. The same considerations apply apparently to other communities where missile bases have been installed within logistically convenient range: Wichita and Salina, Kansas; Little Rock, Arkansas; the Rome-Utica complex in New York; Lincoln, Nebraska; Altus, Oklahoma; Abilene, Texas and Plattsburgh, New York, among others. With heavy ground-burst attacks directed at such targets, the nearby communities would come under fallout of intensities far above those against which the do-it-yourself basement shelter, supplied for two weeks of refuge, could afford protection.

Population An Easy Target

The elaborate studies of the fallout hazard can be set aside entirely if the attacker should choose to attack the population directly. As the expert who presented the hypothetical 3,000-megaton fallout attack at the August civil defense hearing said: "So far as initial impact of any attack is concerned, the level of fatalities is extremely sensitive to attack design." The attacker could, for example, adopt the strategy of "counterforce plus bonus." By diverting 10 per-cent of the 30,000 megatons, or 3,000 megatons, to civilian targets he could, according to this witness, "kill as many as 120 million people." He would take as his bonus the substantially complete destruction of U.S. civilization. The population is a soft target and it takes fewer megatons to kill the corporate body of the state than to destroy the forces that are supposed to defend it.

Civil defense, it is said, "increased markedly our ability to survive war if it is fought by rational methods." But there is little reason to think that a real war will be fought by the rational strategies of game theory that are supplied as inputs to a computer. The experience of history suggests that the first exchange, if "rational," will trigger an unlimited escalation of violence. Not only the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but their allies and satellites and the neutrals in line of fire face the same dread prospect. We are assured that the empty world of "On the Beach" is pure fiction. But the firestorms of a thermonuclear war could work an irreversible disruption of the social and moral fabric of Western Civilization. The kind of society that would emerge from the shelters may be guessed from the kind of society that is preparing to go into shelters now.

We are personally witness to this escalation, in the rising tide of callousness and brutality here at home. It is to be seen, at the top level of our Government, in the writing-off of Tucson and other cities by the siting of missile bases in their immediate environs. It shames our people before the world in the climax of American privatism that prescribes a sawed-off shotgun as equipment for the family fallout shelter.

The civil defense program of our Federal Government, however else intended, must be regarded as a step in the escalation process. This is a sinister development because it works a psychological subversion of both government and citizenry. It gives the sanction of action to the delusion that a thermonuclear war can be fought and survived. It encourages statesmen to take larger risks predicated upon First Strike Credibility and Post-Attack Recuperative Capacity. It disengages the citizen from vigilence over the rationality and responsibility of his elected officials.

On the other side of the world power contest, in satisfaction of the equations of war game theory, it invites a Pre-emptive Strike. For the dubious protection it promises, civil defense has exacted a dangerous cost to national security.

The Administration has yielded to pressure from essentially two quarters. The first originates with irresponsible politicians in both parties who have adopted fallout defense as a mode of political dynamism. The second and much more significant pressure originates with the military and its commitment to military solutions, backed by the powerful economic interest in those solutions that has come to be the biggest business in the land. But a primary responsibility for this hoax on public opinion must be laid to those authors of fraud by computer who produced the literature that argues the feasibility of thermonuclear war.

The Administration's purchase of this hoax raises two grim possibilities. First, it may have seriously compromised its capacity to rally public opinion in favor of the settlements it is seeking to negotiate at the conference table. Second, in the mood of mounting fear and truculence, the Administration may find it has provoked demagogic clamor for a civil-defense program going far beyond the present one.

Such programs have been studied. The down-payment on the cost of taking the nation underground would be $150 billion. But that is only the fiscal cost. The social cost of going underground would not fall far short of the total transformation of our way of life, the suspension of our civil institutions, the habituation of our people to violence and the ultimate militarization of our society. By that time it would surely be difficult to define the ideological conflict that the war is supposed to be fought about. And by that time, the technology of thermonuclear war will no doubt be equal to hunting out its targets underground.

If this analysis suggests that a third alternative to the choice of surrender or death may be found in the Garrison State, let me urge a fourth alternative. We must accept the truth that thermonuclear war cannot settle even the most irreconcilable conflict to anybody's satisfaction. With all due caution we must seek the settlement of political differences by peaceful means. Concurrently we must seek an immediate halt in the arms race and thereafter general and complete disarmament under controls that will protect mankind from its resumption. The two elements are inseparable; for it is clear that there would be no German problem if we had disarmament and that there can be no convention on disarmament that does not include China.

We must summon our wisdom as well as our courage in this epoch of danger. If we enter into negotiation in distrust and fear of the other party, we must bear in mind that the other party bears the same distrust and fear of us. Both sides are driven to the conference table by the same iron compulsion that flows from the thermonuclear inversion of the Golden Rule.

If You Can't Dig A Shelter Buy Yourself A Yacht

"'When the Bomb falls,' read a recent city classified advertisement offering to sell a cabin cruiser, 'climb aboard and sail away.' This is not so dreadfully ludicrous as it sounds. Americans own some 470,000 covered boats more than 16 feet long, and according to a study made for the OCDM by Technical Operations, Inc., these provide potential fallout for anywhere between 2,000,000 and 5,000,000 people. It is now known that fallout particles disperse rapidly in water; and in water that is deep and wide enough vessels can provide a shelter factor of at least 100—equal to a concrete block basement shelter. . . . This assumes, of course, that the vessels escape blast, fire and tidal wave, and that people can get to them in time."

—Fortune Magazine, November 1961.

The Kind of Indoctrination Being Given Fallout Instructors at Oak Ridge

"The goodie-goodies and the fancy pants—the brains minus the brawn—are most apt to fall by the wayside when war comes. Not if war comes—just when—says the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Psychologist H. B. Hurt.

"'There will be a war,' Dr. Hurt stated last night. 'I believe this. Lord, I hate to say that. But I know it is just a question of when and the main thing we have to fear is people out of control—more even than the atom out of control,' he said. Dr. Hurt spoke at the final Civil Defense fallout instructors training session.

"Highly intellectualized people are more likely to freeze under attack than other people. Goodie-goods and fancy people are more apt to panic,' he said. Some facts of life are so damned ugly. I have seen people kill each other for food and in lifeboats during World War II. There were only so many who could successfully occupy them. I have seen them take oars and beat other people on the head who were trying to get in.

"'I recommend that everyone with a fallout shelter include a gun in their equipment. . . . I recommend shooting anyone who tries to invide a fallout shelter."

—The Oak Ridger (Oak Ridge, Tenn.), Nov. 8.

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Korean Dictator Honored by National Press Club Though He Sentences Editors to Death

Nationwide Petition for Clemency to HUAC Victims Ignored by Press

It is curious how conditioned our press is to a bored indifference on the subject of civil liberties. Here in Washington last week a delegation of respected religious leaders—including Clarence Pickett of the Friends, Dr. Howard Schomer of Chicago Theological Seminary and Dr. John A. Mackey of Princeton—went to the White House and the Justice Department with a national clemency appeal for Frank Wilkinson and Carl Braden, both in jail for one year for contempt of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Afterwards they held a press conference to which the wire services, the big Eastern seaboard newspapers including the *New York Times,* and the few liberal papers of the country had been invited. Not a single reporter (but yours truly) appeared and not a line was printed next day about the petition, though its 3,000 signers from 48 States included the Rev. Martin Luther King, Grenville Clark, Reinhold Niebuhr, Harry Golden, Thurman Arnold, Norman Thomas, Irving Brant, Padraic Colum, Lewis Gannett, Archibald Macleish, Walter Millis, John Nevin Sayre, Erwin Panofsky, Pitirim A. Sorokin, George de Santillana, Karl Menninger and many others whose names normally make news. The petition they signed was a sharp attack on the House Committee and a defense of First Amendment rights.

Don't U.S. Pressmen Care?

Another example: The new military dictator of South Korea, Gen. Pak Chung Hui, has ended his country's brief spell of press freedom since Rhee's overthrow. Many newspapermen are in jail and three top men on a suppressed Socialist paper the "Minjuk Ilbo" have been sentenced to die. Their crime was advocating reunification; this is treason in South Korea though patriotism in West Germany. The International Press Institute in Geneva appealed on their behalf in vain. *The Guardian* in England (Nov. 11) did likewise, and the *Washington Post* which hailed Gen. Pak and his lieutenants as "well motivated young men" Nov. 10 turned around Nov. 14 and questioned the death sentences. The State Department has utilized its battalion of trained seals to launch a flood of friendly stories to Gen. Pak on the eve of his visit; none of the stories mention his repressive press policies. Now, to cap it all, the National Press Club is giving Gen. Pak a luncheon the day we go to press.

Third example: Ed Murrow of USIA courageously took advantage of a speech before the Public Relations Society of America in Houston, Texas, last Monday (Nov. 13) to strike at the rising tide of rightism. He attacked those who "under the banner of patriotism . . . would exorcise the very spirit of this land with the excuse of combatting Communism." He said, with obvious reference to Birchites and Walkerites and similar screwballs, "They would spy upon their neighbors . . . impeach the judiciary . . . support the intrusion of politics into the military . . . impose upon the land stifling uniformity falsely labelled as 'loyalty'." The story appeared on the AP ticker but the morning after I could find it neither in the *New York Times* nor the *Washington Post,* though both agree editorially with these sentiments. To jaded city editors civil liberties just isn't news unless the violation occurs in Moscow.

Stalin's Habits Outlast His Name

Three recent items should worry thoughtful Russians anxious to get rid of Stalin era habits. One is the news that the South African government, benighted as it is, nevertheless granted a passport to the Zulu chief Luthuli to go to Oslo to accept the Nobel prize; this contrasts with Soviet treatment of Pasternak who was forced to refuse the prize. The second is the open letter from Trotzky's widow asking a review of the 1936 "show trial" of Trotzky, and about the fate of her son Sergei who disappeared after his arrest on the eve of the trial. Khrushchev is trying to do to Stalin what Stalin tried to do to Trotzky—wipe out his very memory. The third item is the public admission, in the wake of a story brought back from the Soviet Union by Rowland Evans of the New York Herald-Tribune (Nov. 6) that three leaders of the Leningrad Jewish community were sentenced to prison in a secret trial last October. What is the meaning of "socialist legality" when trials can be held in secret? Are Soviet Jews again to be treated as second-class citizens under Khrushchev as they were under Stalin?

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